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Abstract
This paper models the interaction between individuals￿identity choices and redistri-
bution. Both redistributive polices and identity choices are endogenous, and there
might be multiple equilibria. The model is applied to ethnicity and social class. In
an equilibrium with high taxes, the poor identify as poor and favor high taxes. In an
equilibrium with low taxes, at least some of the poor identify with their ethnic group
and favor low taxes. The model has two main predictions. First, redistribution is
highest when society is ethnically homogenous, but the e⁄ect of ethnic diversity on
redistribution is not necessarily monotonic. Second, when income inequality is low,
an increase in income inequality might induce the poor to identify with their ethnic
group and therefore favor lower taxes.
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tion, ethnic diversity, social class.
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The Marxian solidarity between the toilers of all the earth will, indeed, have a
long way to go as far as concerns solidarity of the poor white Americans with
the toiling Negro. (Myrdal 1944, p. 69)
Both the canonical economic theory of redistribution (e.g. Meltzer and Richard 1981)
and Marxian theory assume that people￿ s political preferences are determined by their
economic position in society. This view is controversial. Con￿ icts along other dimensions,
such as ethnicity, race, religion or gender, may be more important than social class. In
particular, it has often been argued that class con￿ ict is rare in societies that are ethnically
divided. For example, the racial diversity among the American working class is a recurring
theme in the literature on the failure to establish a strong worker￿ s movement in the United
States.1
The view that there are multiple dimensions of political con￿ ict provokes the question
under what circumstances there is salient political con￿ ict along a particular dimension.
This question has previously been addressed from a ￿political supply-side￿perspective,
i.e., why politicians may want to bundle policies on economic and non-economic issues for
given voter preferences (e.g., Roemer, 1998, Lee and Roemer, 2006 and Roemer and van
der Straeten, 2005, 2006). In this paper, we focus on the complementary ￿demand-side￿
question about the determinants of voter preferences for redistribution.
In-group favoritism is a well-documented fact (e.g., Bernhard et al., 2006, Goette et
al., 2006 and E⁄erson et al., 2008) and a potentially important determinant of preferences
for redistribution.2 For example, a poor person in a relatively rich ethnic minority group is
likely to prefer more redistribution if she primarily sees herself as belonging to the working
class rather than her ethnic group. In this paper, we view identity as altruism directed
toward a speci￿c group and study the determinants and consequences of voters￿identity
choices.3 In our formal framework both redistribution and identity choices are endogenously
determined. We use ethnicity and social class as our leading example throughout the paper,
but the model is applicable to any situation where there are two potential dimensions of
social cleavage.4
1See, for example, Myrdal (1944), Glazer and Moynihan (1970) and Lipset and Marks (2000).
2Furthermore, ethnicity and class are often signi￿cant predictors of preferences for redistribution. For
example, see Fong (2001), Alesina et al. (2001) and Alesina and La Ferrara (2005b) for evidence that
white people in the US are more negative toward redistribution than African-Americans also when personal
income is held constant.
3See Charness et al. (2007) and Chen and Li (2009) for recent empirical evidence that individuals are
altruistic toward the group they identify with.
4See Posner (2005) for a variety of di⁄erent examples of two-dimensional social cleavages, and Alesina
1In the model, identity choices are determined by two factors. First, individuals tend to
identify with groups that have high status, which in the model is equivalent to a high after-
tax income. This assumption is motivated by a large body of empirical research in social
psychology (see Roccas, 2003 for a survey). Second, people tend to identify with groups
that are similar to themselves. This assumption is consistent both with self-categorization
theory in social psychology (Turner et al., 1987) and with evolutionary theory.
Incorporating endogenous identity choices into a standard model of redistribution (e.g.
Meltzer and Richard 1981) profoundly changes the predictions. In the standard model,
changes in the distribution of income and composition of ethnic groups only a⁄ect the level
of redistribution by changing the median relative to the average income in the population.
In our model, however, such changes also a⁄ect the level of redistribution by shifting the
identity choices of members in di⁄erent ethnic groups.
Most importantly, the model yields novel insights regarding the e⁄ect of ethnic diversity
on redistribution. On the one hand, increasing the size of an ethnic group makes class
identi￿cation more attractive for members of this ethnic group because it now constitutes
a large fraction of each social class. This implies that the poor in the ethnic group may
start to identify with their social class and support higher levels of redistribution. On the
other hand, increasing the size of one ethnic group implies that class identi￿cation becomes
less attractive for other ethnic groups since these groups now constitute a smaller fraction
of each social class.
For example, consider the simplest possible case when there is only two social classes
(rich and poor) and two ethnic groups (black and white). In this case, poor whites are most
prone to identify as poor and favor high taxes when there are no blacks in society at all.
As the number of blacks increases, the perceived similarity with the poor group decreases,
implying that poor whites might switch to a white identity. Since whites are on average
richer than the poor, poor whites will favor lower taxes if they primarily identify themselves
as white. This mechanism can explain why social class seems to be more important, and
redistribution higher, in ethnically more homogeneous societies (e.g. Scandinavia compared
to the US). However, for poor blacks, an increase in the proportion of blacks implies that
they become more similar to the poor group. Consequently, an increase in the number of
blacks might induce poor blacks to identify with the poor and favor more redistribution.
The e⁄ect of ethnic diversity on redistribution is therefore not necessarily monotonic in
our model.
The endogeneity of identity choices also changes the relationship between pre-tax in-
come inequality and redistribution. In the model, an increase in pre-tax income inequality
and La Ferrara (2005a) for further motivation why ethnic identiti￿cation is likely to be endogenous to
economic policy.
2from a low level increases after-tax income di⁄erences and hence the status di⁄erence be-
tween ethnic and poor identities. This implies that the poor become more likely to identify
with their ethnic group and favor low taxes. Higher pre-tax income inequality might con-
sequently lead to less redistribution. This is in accordance with empirical evidence (e.g.
Perotti 1996 and Lind 2005) but contrasts with the standard model of redistribution (e.g.
Meltzer and Richard 1981).
A feature of the model is that there is a complementarity between tax rates and identity
choices. A higher tax rate increases the after-tax income of the poor group more than the
income of the ethnic groups. This increases the status of the poor identity relative to ethnic
identities and makes it more likely that the poor identify with their social class and prefer
higher taxes. The complementarity between tax rates and identity choices implies that
there might be multiple equilibria. For example, we may have one high tax equilibrium
where the poor identify as poor and one low tax equilibrium where they identify with their
respective ethnic group.5
Our approach di⁄ers from previous economic theories of ethnic diversity and redistrib-
utive policies.6 First, there are models that expand the policy space with a non-economic
issue or targeted transfers. Roemer (1998), Lee and Roemer (2006) and Roemer and van
der Straeten (2005, 2006) study how an additional non-economic political issue such as
religion or race leads to a bundling e⁄ect of political policies.7 A citizen that favors a
high degree of redistribution may vote for a political party that advocates a low degree of
redistribution if he favors the political party￿ s position on racial issues. Building on Levy
(2004), FernÆndez and Levy (2008) instead consider endogenous political parties where the
policy space consists of general redistribution and targeted public goods. For intermediate
levels of preference diversity they ￿nd that the rich might form a winning coalition with
special interest groups among the poor to reduce general redistribution. A second type of
explanation, put forward by, e.g., Alesina et al. (1999) and Alesina et al. (2001), concerns
a direct e⁄ect of ethnic fragmentation on voter preferences for redistribution. In these au-
thors￿view, a voter￿ s altruistic motive for redistribution is con￿ned to people that belong
5The presence of multiple equilibria suggests that the model may be di¢ cult to test empirically. How-
ever, the formally stated results provide predictions given initial identity choices, incomes and population
proportions of di⁄erent groups. Income and population proportions are easily available data, and there are
several ways to empirically measure people￿ s identities, for example using survey responses or the prob-
ability of homogamy (see Bisin et al. 2006 for a recent example). Given such data, our model provides
empirically testable predictions for both the level of redistribution and individuals￿identity choices.
6More generally, ethnic heterogeneity might of course also in￿ uence economic outcomes through other
channels than the political system. For example, ethnicity might in￿ uence the ease by which people
cooperate, act as focal points in coordination games or a⁄ect the possibility to enforce social forms through
social networks. See Habyarimana et al. (2007) for references and an overview of this literature.
7Austen-Smith and Wallerstein (2006) develop a related model of legislative bargaining. See also Conde-
Ruiz and Galasso (2003) for a model of bidimensional voting in a di⁄erent context.
3to her own ethnic group. Common to both types of explanations is that voters￿political
preferences on ethnic issues are exogenous, whereas both preferences and redistribution are
determined endogenously in our model.
This paper is most closely related to Shayo (2009).8 He develops a general theoret-
ical framework of social identi￿cation and applies it to a model of redistribution where
individuals have a choice between identifying with their social class (rich or poor) and a
common nationalist identity. We apply a similar model of redistribution to the study of
ethnic identi￿cation. In particular, we introduce heterogeneity along two dimensions, i.e.,
both income and ethnicity. Among other things, this implies that more than one group can
in￿ uence the tax rate, creating an interdependence between the identity choices of di⁄erent
groups. A second di⁄erence is that we can explicitly study the e⁄ects of changes in the
demographic composition of society, such as an increase in ethnic diversity.
In the next section of the paper, we develop the model with arbitrarily many ethnic
groups and social classes. We show that in this general setting, but with restrictive as-
sumptions on the income distribution, increasing the size of a small ethnic group, or adding
a small ethnic group to the population, might reduce the level of redistribution. This is in
line with the empirical ￿nding that ethnic diversity is associated with lower levels of redis-
tribution (see Alesina and La Ferrara 2005 for a survey of this literature). In Section 3 we
outline the more tractable case when there are only two social classes (rich and poor) and
two ethnic groups (black and white), which allows us to derive the richer set of predictions
that are discussed in Section 4 and 5. Section 6 discusses how social mobility can be ana-
lyzed in our model. The ￿nal section discusses ￿American Exceptionalism￿ ￿ the di⁄erence
in redistribution between the United States and Western Europe￿ in the context of our
model.
2 General Model
Consider a set of N agents, a ￿nite set C of social classes and a ￿nite set E of ethnic
groups. The model could equally well be applied to identities along two other dimensions,
for example language and religion, but we focus on class and ethnicity in the remainder of
the paper. We view a social class as a particular interval of the income distribution, i.e.,
all agents within a certain income interval belongs to the social class corresponding to that
8See Penn (2008) for another application of Shayo￿ s framework.
4interval.9 Each agent also belongs to an ethnic group.10 All social classes are represented
in every ethnic group, and we refer to a particular combination of class and ethnicity as a
type. Agents must choose to identify with either their ethnic group or their social class.11
Given this identity choice, agents also choose which tax rate to vote for. Simple majority
voting selects the winning tax rate and in equilibrium we require that the resulting tax
rate is consistent with identity and voting choices.
Each agent in the economy is endowed with pre-tax income yi > 0 and the average
income in the population is denoted by y. There is a single proportional tax rate t and tax
revenues are redistributed lump-sum.12 There is a quadratic deadweight loss of taxation
equal to (t2=2)y.13 This implies that that the income after taxes and transfers of agent i
is ￿ yi = (1 ￿ t)yi + (t ￿ t2=2)y. Similarly, let yj denote the average pre-tax income of the
agents belonging to ethnic group j 2 E or social class j 2 C so that their average after-tax
income (including transfers) is given by ￿ yj = (1 ￿ t)yj + (t ￿ t2=2)y.
Since each agent belongs to one social class and one ethnic group, the average income
of these two categories will generally di⁄er. For an agent with low income, the average
income in her ethnic group will typically be higher than in her social class, whereas for rich
people the social class will typically have a higher average income than the ethnic group.
We refer to the category with the higher pre-tax income as the agent￿ s high status identity
and the other as the low status identity. The average pre-tax income in the high status
versus low status identity is denoted by yH and yL where yH ￿ yL. The identity choice
9It is not necessary to de￿ne social classes in terms of income intervals. One can think of more com-
plicated mappings that takes educational and cultural aspects into account. Proposition 1 holds also with
such alternative interpretations.
10We assume that there is an uncontroversial way to determine which ethnic group each agent in the
economy belongs to. In practice, this is of course easier said than done. For an axiomatic approach to
determination of group membership, see Kasher and Rubinstein (1997).
11This assumption raises three related issues. First, we do not allow an individual to identify with
her type, i.e., her particular combination of class and ethnicity. The model takes the social categories as
exogenous and we do not think types are relevant social categories in most settings, but type identi￿cation
could easily be incorporated into the model. Second, why can an individual not identify with both her
ethnic group and her social class? In this setting, an agent ￿cannot have both￿since she has to vote for her
preferred level of redistribution which forces her to decide on how much to favor either of her two groups.
However, it is straightforward to allow for intermediate identi￿cation, e.g. 30 percent class identi￿cation
and 70 percent ethnic identi￿cation (see footnote 14). Third, we do not allow agents to identify with a
group they do not belong to. Though we could allow agents to identify with any group in society, this
aspect is not relevant in contexts where it is very costly to shift ethnic identity (for example, from black
to white in the US).
12We do not allow targeted redistribution. Although this might be a relevant extension, there are
two main reasons why we focus on general redistribution (i.e., from rich to poor). First, the empirical
literature concerning ethnic diversity and redistribution mainly concerns general redistribution. Second,
many democracies have high legal barriers to discriminatory redistributive policies which limits the scope
for redistribution targeted to speci￿c ethnic groups.
13The results in this section of the paper holds as long as the deadweight loss is strictly convex in t so
that unique solutions to agents￿voting problems exist and preferences are single-peaked.
5consists of choosing li to be either zero or one, where li = 1 means that the agent identi￿es
with the low status group and li = 0 that she identi￿es with her high status group.14
An agent￿ s utility consists of two parts: material utility arising from after-tax income
including transfers and the immaterial utility arising from identi￿cation with a group.
Immaterial utility from group identi￿cation in turn consists of the status of the group and
the perceived similarity with the other members of the group. Group status is linearly
increasing in the group￿ s after-tax average income. We focus on after-tax (instead of pre-
tax) income di⁄erences because consumption is a more credible signal of economic status
than pre-tax income. While many forms of consumption, like housing, cars or clothes, are
directly visible markers of economic status, tax records are not public information in most
countries.15 We assume that people tend to identify with groups with high status, which
is well-documented in empirical research (see Roccas, 2003 for a survey).
The utility function is assumed to be additively separable and take the following form:
Ui = ￿ yi (t) + li [￿￿ yL (t) ￿ ￿dL] + (1 ￿ li)[￿￿ yH (t) ￿ ￿dH]; (1)
where t is the prevailing tax rate, ￿ yH (t) and ￿ yL (t) are the after-tax incomes of the two
categories the agent belongs to and dL and dH the corresponding distances to (or dissim-
ilarity with) each group. The ￿rst term in the utility function represents direct material
bene￿t of after-tax income, the second term the immaterial utility when identifying with
the low status group and the last term the immaterial utility when identifying with the
high status group. The parameters ￿ and ￿ are positive so that utility is increasing in
status and decreasing in perceived distance.
The distances to a group is higher the larger is the share of people of a di⁄erent type
than oneself in the group. Based on research in social psychology, the tendency to iden-
tify with groups that are perceived to be similar to oneself can be viewed as a cognitive
process of self-categorization and our measure of dissimilarity can be seen as distances in
a conceptual space (see Shayo, 2009 for further discussion). However, it may also re￿ ect
a more automated and a⁄ective process. People tend to be more altruistic toward kin
than nonkin, but, as argued by for example Waldman (1987), the recognition of kin is not
perfect and relies on a variety of proximate mechanisms. Similarity in terms of ethnicity or
social standing may thus function as perceptual cues that trigger altruistic behavior even
when actual kinship bonds are weak.
14We assume that an agent cannot partially identify with a group. However, Proposition 1 is una⁄ected
if the agent is allowed to pick li 2 [0;1] as long as the speci￿cation implies a unique solution l￿
i (t) that is
non-decreasing in t.
15Note, however, that it is not critical that status only depends on after-tax income. Status may also
depend on other exogenous factors, such as pre-tax income and occupation, which could be incorporated
into the model without qualitatively changing our results.
6In order to de￿ne the distance functions more precisely, let pjk denote the proportion
in the population that belong to social class j 2 C and ethnic group k 2 E. The distance











where d(￿) is some positive and increasing real-valued function and ￿ > 0. In other words,
the distance to the class identity is increasing in the proportion of people belonging to the
same social class that is from a di⁄erent ethnic group. The parameter ￿ is a measure of
ethnic tensions ￿if ￿ is high, the distance to the class identity is large since the members
of a social class come from di⁄erent ethnic groups.
Similarly, an agent that belongs to social class j and ethnic group k has the following










where ￿ > 0 is a measure of class tensions. Note that perceived distances do not depend on
tax rates ￿the tax rate only a⁄ects the material utility and the relative status of groups.
The above speci￿cation implies that the distance to an identity is una⁄ected by the
identity choices of other agents ￿the distance to a certain identity only depends on char-
acteristics of the population.
The tax rate t is determined by simple majority voting or some other political process
that selects the median tax under the assumption of single-peaked preferences. The polit-
ical process will hence be a mapping ￿ from the vector of all tax votes t￿ 2 ￿i2N[0;1] to a
median tax rate t 2 [0;1].
We require that the following three conditions must hold in equilibrium:





f￿ yi (t) + li [￿￿ yL (t) ￿ ￿dL] + (1 ￿ li)[￿￿ yH (t) ￿ ￿dH]g:
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￿ (t))) = t:
7Note that identity and voting choices are taken separately. The main reason for this
assumption is that these are two conceptually di⁄erent decisions that are likely to be made
under di⁄erent circumstances and at di⁄erent points in time. The equilibrium concept
is aimed to capture the steady state of a dynamic process where people vote for taxes
given their identity choices, but may change their identity choice as a new tax rate is
implemented.16 A second reason is that preferences for taxes are single-peaked only for
given identity choices. In order to be able to use the median voter theorem we cannot
admit agents to switch identity at the same time as they choose tax rates.
First consider the agents￿voting choices. The utility function (1) is strictly concave in












Note that this tax rate is non-decreasing in li, i.e., the more the agent identi￿es with the
low status identity, the higher is her preferred tax. The reason is that people are altruistic
toward the group they identify with. Since the low status group is poorer, an agent favors
more redistribution if she identi￿es with that group. That people tend vote for tax rates
in this way is shown in an experiment by Klor and Shayo (2007).
Now consider optimal identity choices. For a given tax rate t, an agent chooses the high
status identity, i.e., li = 0, if17
￿ (1 ￿ t)(yH ￿ yL) > ￿ (dH ￿ dL): (3)
It is clear from this condition that l￿
i (t) is non-decreasing in t. In other words, for given
distances, a higher tax rate implies that the low status identity becomes relatively more
attractive since redistribution bene￿ts the low status group more. The higher the prevailing
tax rate, the more likely it is that people identify with their low status identity, which in
turn would imply that they vote for higher tax rates. Since the median tax rate is non-
decreasing in the vector of tax rate choices, there is a complementarity between identity
choices and the tax rate. This complementarity means that there are potentially many
equilibria, but it also allows us to establish that at least one equilibrium exists.
Proposition 1 There exists at least one equilibrium.
16Furthermore, we implicitly assume that players aren￿ t forward looking in the sense that they anticipate
their own or others future tax and identity choices when making identity and voting decisions.
17In the unlikely event that an agent is indi⁄erent between the two identities, we will assume that the
agent chooses the low status identity.
8All proofs are provided in the Appendix.
It is di¢ cult to derive any general comparative statics without further specifying the
model. In order to derive results for the e⁄ects of an increase in ethnic diversity that are
not confounded by income di⁄erences between ethnic groups, we ￿rst study the simplest
possible distribution of income.
Suppose there are only two income levels, yR > yP > 0, and consequently two social
classes, rich (R) and poor (P). The poor are in majority and all ethnic groups have same
proportion of poor. From the expression for the most preferred tax rate (2) we see that
these assumptions imply that the rich prefer zero taxes irrespective of how they identify
themselves, and that the poor always prefer positive taxes. The median voter(s) must
therefore be poor. From the condition for high status identi￿cation (3) it is clear that
the identity choices of the poor only di⁄er in the distances to the poor identity. The
larger the ethnic group a poor individual belongs to, the smaller is the distance to the
poor identity and the more likely she is to identify with the poor. There are only two
possible equilibrium tax rates in this setting. In the high tax equilibrium, the poor in
relatively large ethnic groups identify as poor and they are su¢ ciently many to create a
majority for their preferred tax rate, which is high since they are altruistic toward the poor.
In the low tax equilibrium, the poor in relatively small ethnic groups identify with their
ethnic groups and are su¢ ciently many to be pivotal. This tax rate is lower since they are
altruistic toward their ethnic groups that contain both rich and poor.18 Increasing the size
of an existing ethnic group, or adding an ethnic group with the same proportion of poor as
the already existing ones, implies that all other ethnic groups shrink in relative size, and
consequently, that the distances to the poor identity increase. As long as the enlarged or
added ethnic group is su¢ ciently small, the set of parameter values that can support the
high tax equilibrium shrinks, which is stated in Proposition 2.19 Proposition 2 and the
propositions that follow below provide conditions under which a change in parameters may
render the initial equilibrium unfeasible. Hence, we do not consider the possibility that the
economy may shift from one equilibrium to another in the presence of multiple equilibria.
Proposition 2 Let pj denote the proportion of the population belonging to ethnic group j.
If the assumptions in the previous paragraph hold, there is a threshold b p such that the poor
of ethnic group j identify with their ethnicity if pj < b p. Increasing the size of an existing
ethnic group smaller than b p, or adding a new ethnic group that has the same proportion of
18There may of course also be equilibria where all poor identify either as poor or with their ethnic
groups.
19Although Proposition 2 is stated in terms of a threshold b p that is not directly observable, the threshold
can be indirectly inferred from initial identity choices (since ethnic groups identify di⁄erently depending
on whether they are below or above the threshold).
9poor as the pre-existing population and a size smaller than b p, increases the proportion of
poor that identify with their ethnic group and might lower the equilibrium tax rate.
In line with Proposition 2, several papers have shown empirically that there is a negative
relation between ethnic heterogeneity and redistribution both across countries and between
communities within countries. For example, Alesina et al. (2001) found social spending to
be lower in countries with a high degree of racial fractionalization; Alesina et al. (1999)
found a lower degree of public goods provision in ethnically fragmented metropolitan areas
in the US, and Soss et al. (2001) found that when US states were given greater autonomy
to set their own welfare policies, states with higher proportion of blacks implemented more
punitive welfare regulations. Luttmer (2001) shows that support for welfare spending in
the US is higher among people living in areas where the proportion of welfare recipients
from their own racial group is high. Similarly, Orr (1976) found a negative correlation
between aid to families with dependent children and the proportion of non-white welfare
recipients across US states.
A seemingly paradoxical ￿nding that our model can explain is why class voting, i.e.,
the extent to which voting behavior coincide with social class, seems to be particularly im-
portant in Scandinavian countries ￿which have the lowest income inequality in the world.
Our answer is that the Scandinavian countries are relatively ethnically homogeneous, sug-
gesting that the poor identify with their class.20 In line with this explanation, Nieuwbeerta
and Ultee (1999) found a negative correlation between religious and ethnic diversity and
the level of class voting.
The model also suggests that members of small ethnic groups tend to identify with
their ethnicity, which resonates well with the picture of New York in the 1960s described
by Glazer and Moynihan (1970).21 A similar idea has also been used by the authoritarian
former leader of Singapore, Lee Kuan Yew, to legitimize Singapore￿ s one-party system:
In multiracial societies, you don￿ t vote in accordance with your economic inter-
ests and social interests, you vote in accordance with race and religion. Sup-
posing I￿ d run their system [democracy] here: Malays would vote for Muslims,
Indians would vote for Indians, the Chinese would vote for Chinese. (Spiegel
2005, p. 23)
20According to Nieuwbeerta and Ultee (1999), class voting was particularly important in the Scandina-
vian countries at least until the 1980s. Since then class voting has declined, but on the other hand the
Scandinavian countries have also become more ethnically heterogenous due to immigration.
21The notion that members of small ethnic groups identify ethnically is consistent with the empirical
evidence in Scheve and Slaughter (2001) showing that immigrants have more favorable attitudes toward
immigration, also when income is controlled for.
10Although Lee Kuan Yew may be right that Malays and Indians in Singapore would vote
for their own ethnic groups if they were allowed to vote, it is less clear that the Chinese
would do so since they constitute roughly three quarters of the population.22
The idea that ethnic identi￿cation is stronger the smaller is the ethnic group is also
in line with the study of ethnic minorities in the UK by Bisin et al. (2006). They ￿nd
evidence that the higher is the percentage of a person￿ s own ethnic group in the neigh-
borhood, the lower is the degree of ethnic identi￿cation and the probability of homogamy.
Similarly, Fryer and Torelli (2006) ￿nd that the phenomenon of ￿ acting white￿among blacks
￿interpreted as racial di⁄erences in the relationship between academic performance and
popularity ￿is stronger in US schools with few black students.
Proposition 2 requires quite strong assumptions on the distribution of income and size
of ethnic groups. We therefore specify a simpler version of the model with only two ethnic
groups, which allows us to study the e⁄ects of ethnic diversity and income inequality under
less restrictive assumptions.
3 Black and White Model
In the remainder of the paper, we consider a simpler model with two social classes, poor
(P) and rich (R), and two ethnic groups, black (B) and white (W). As we argue in Section
7, we believe this simpli￿cation is relevant for the US, where the main ethnic division
has traditionally been between the African-American population and people of European
origin. The simpli￿ed model is also likely to be relevant for other countries ￿for example
ethnic divisions between the native population and non-European immigrants in Europe
and between the French and English speaking population of Canada.
We denote the proportion of the four di⁄erent types in the population by pPB, pRB, pPW
and pRW and as before we assume that all four types are represented in the population. In
addition, we assume that no type, or sum of two or three types, consists of exactly half the
population since this allows us to disregard the possibility of the median falling between
two types￿preferred tax rate.
All individuals of a certain type are identical ￿all people in the rich income group have
pre-tax income yR and everybody in the poor group have income yP satisfying yR > yP >
0.23 This speci￿cation implies that the status of the ethnic groups is in between the status
of the poor and rich groups. In other words, the ethnic identity is the high status identity
for poor people, whereas it is the low status identity for rich people.
22In all cases, it is a poor argument for not allowing the citizens of Singapore to vote.
23It would admittedly be more realistic to allow agents with di⁄erent individual incomes, but that makes
it di¢ cult to derive interesting comparative statics results. In the Appendix of Lindqvist and ￿stling (2007)
we nevertheless consider this alternative and show that the result in Proposition 3 is similar in that setting.
11Actual income distributions are typically skewed so that the median income is less than
the average income. Since there are only two income levels in the model, we therefore
assume that the poor population is in majority, i.e., pPB + pPW > 1=2. Without loss of
generality, we also assume that the white population is in majority, i.e., pPW + pRW >
1=2. Given these assumptions, we have two di⁄erent cases. First, if poor whites are in
majority, the tax rate is uniquely determined by their identity choice. Second, if poor
whites do not constitute a majority of the population, both poor whites and poor blacks
could potentially determine the tax rate. We assume that the white and black population
have the same average income, i.e., pRW=pPW = pRB=pPB. In Lindqvist and ￿stling (2007),
we derive formal results also for the case when the white population is richer on average,
i.e., pRW=pPW > pRB=pPB. In this version of the paper, we mostly give a verbal account
for this case.
The distance function d(￿) is given by the following table:





















This linear speci￿cation implies that it is costless to identify with a group where everybody
is of the same type as oneself, whereas the cost goes to ￿ or ￿ when there are nobody like
oneself in that group.
We now turn to determining the equilibria of this model. First, recall from (2) that the
optimal tax rate of someone belonging to social class j and ethnic group k that identi￿es











It is clear that rich people who identify themselves as rich prefer a zero tax rate (since
yR > y) and that poor people who identify themselves as poor prefer the tax rate 1￿yP=y.











The optimal voting choices (4) and (5) imply that preferred tax rates can be ordered within
ethnic groups ￿for example, rich whites always prefer lower taxes than poor whites.
12Lemma 1 Optimal tax rates always satisfy the following:




PWP = 1 ￿ yP=y;




PBP = 1 ￿ yP=y:





Lemma 1 implies that when whites are richer than blacks and all types identify with
their ethnic group, blacks prefer the same or higher taxes than whites holding income
constant. Fong (2001), Alesina et al. (2001) and Alesina and La Ferrara (2005b) show
empirically that white people in the US are more negative toward redistribution than
African-Americans also when personal income is held constant. This suggests that the
poor in the US identify along ethnic lines rather than with their social class.
If whites are richer than blacks, the status of the ethnic identity is higher for poor
whites than for poor blacks. However, that whites are richer also means that the distance
for poor whites to the white identity is larger than the distance for poor blacks to the
black identity. It is possible to show that the latter e⁄ect dominates and that poor blacks
always identify as black if poor whites identify as white. This result is dependent on the
linear speci￿cation of the distance function and the assumption that the class and ethnic
tension parameters are the same for all types, but it is also plausible ￿if the poor in the
majority group favor their ethnic group, then we would probably not expect the poor in
the minority group to identify with the poor.
Lemma 2 If whites have the same or higher average income than blacks and poor whites
identify as white, then poor blacks identify as black.
From Proposition 1 we know that at least one equilibrium exists. Since we have assumed
that the poor are in majority, we can show that only the identity choices of the poor matter
for the equilibrium tax rate. When whites and blacks are equally rich, there can only be
two di⁄erent tax rates in equilibrium since poor whites and poor blacks prefer the same tax
rate when they make the same identity choice. For simplicity, we denote the two possible
equilibrium tax rates the poor (t￿
PWP = t￿
PBP) and ethnic (t￿
PWW = t￿
PBB) tax rate.
Lemma 3 If blacks and whites have the same average income, then there are two feasible
equilibrium tax rates:
1. If poor whites are in majority and identify as white, or if poor whites are in minority
and poor blacks identify as black, the equilibrium tax rate will be the ethnic tax rate
(t￿
PWW = t￿
PBB = 1 ￿ (yP + ￿y)=(1 + ￿)y).
132. If poor whites are in majority and identify as poor, or if poor whites are in minority
and poor blacks identify as poor, the equilibrium tax rate will be the poor tax rate
(t￿
PBP = t￿
PWP = 1 ￿ yP=y).
A feature of the model is that there might be multiple equilibria which implies that an
equilibrium can be suboptimal in the sense that each agent of a certain type would reach a
higher utility level if the other agents of the same type changed identity and preferred tax
rate. However, given the identity choices of the other agents, no agent has an incentive to
change identity or vote di⁄erently.24 For example, we might have one high tax equilibrium
where poor whites identify as poor and one low tax equilibrium where they identify as
white. Based on Marxian theory it might be tempting to conclude that the poor are better
o⁄in a high tax equilibrium, and that the poor should be made ￿class conscious￿if the low
tax equilibrium prevails. However, although a class identity would bene￿t their material
interest, our model allows no such conclusion since agents also get utility from their identity
￿it may well be the case that the poor￿ s utility is lower in a high tax than in a low tax
equilibrium.25
Although di⁄erences in redistribution can be explained in terms of multiple equilibria
for identical parameter values, we now go on to study how the set of potential equilibria
changes with the parameters of the model. These results together with some empirical
evidence are presented in the following three sections.
4 Ethnic Diversity
The main lesson from Proposition 2 is that ethnic diversity might induce the poor to
identify with their ethnic group and therefore favor lower taxes. In this section we will see
that this conclusion does not hold universally.
In the black and white model, blacks constitute a minority and we therefore model
an increase of ethnic diversity as an increase in the black population. The results di⁄er
depending on whether poor whites are in majority or not. When poor whites are in
majority, their identity choices alone determine the tax rate. When poor whites are in
minority, the identity choices of poor blacks also a⁄ect the tax rate (unless poor whites
already identify as white).
24Since voting and identity choices are made separately, an agent can end up in a suboptimal equilibrium
even if he is the only agent in the economy (and distances are de￿ned so that this is possible). A single
agent might prefer to simultaneously switch identity and preferred tax rate, but this is ruled out by the
de￿nition of an equilibrium.
25More generally, the idea that people may hold dysfunctional identities is often raised in the literature
on identity and may be important in order to understand self-destructive behaviors such as ￿ghetto culture￿
(see Akerlof and Kranton 2000 for references and further discussion).
14The e⁄ect of ethnic diversity depends both on whether poor whites are in majority and
the extent of interethnic income inequality. Proposition 3 focuses on an increase in the
proportion of blacks when whites and blacks have the same average income. In Lindqvist
and ￿stling (2007), we consider the case when blacks are poorer on average, and we also
study an increase in the number of poor blacks when blacks are poorer. Table 1 summarizes
the overall e⁄ect on the level of redistribution in these three di⁄erent cases. As is clear
from Table 1, the e⁄ect of ethnic diversity is typically not monotonic.
Table 1. E⁄ects on redistribution of an increase in ethnic diversity
Poor whites are in
majority minority
Increase of blacks, no interethnic inequality (Proposition 3) ￿ +
Increase of blacks, interethnic inequality (Prop. 4 in L￿, 2007) ￿ ￿=+
Increase of poor blacks, interethnic inequality (Prop. 5 in L￿, 2007) ￿=+ ￿=+
When blacks and whites are equally rich and the proportion of poor and rich blacks
increases proportionally, the only e⁄ect of an increase in the proportion of blacks on identity
choices is to increase the distance to the class identity for poor whites and decrease it for
poor blacks. The relative status of both identities and distance to the ethnic identity is
una⁄ected by changes in ethnic diversity. As the proportion of blacks increases, poor blacks
therefore become more prone to identify as poor whereas poor whites become more prone
to identify as white.
Proposition 3 Suppose blacks and whites have the same average income. If poor whites
are in majority, then an increase in the black population implies the following for the
equilibrium tax rate:
1. If poor whites initially identify as poor, then poor whites might to switch to the white
identity resulting in a lower equilibrium tax rate.
2. If poor whites initially identify as white, nothing happens to identity choices and tax
rates.
If poor whites are in minority, then an increase in the black population implies the following
for the equilibrium tax rate:
1. If poor whites initially identify as white or both poor whites and poor blacks identify
as poor, then the tax rate is unchanged.
152. If poor whites initially identify as poor and poor blacks identify as black, then poor
blacks might switch to the poor identity resulting in a higher equilibrium tax rate.
To illustrate the full comparative statics, we consider two parametric examples (illus-
trated in Figure 1) with di⁄erent status parameters. The thin dashed vertical line in Figure
1 indicates the proportion of blacks above which poor whites are in minority.
Figure 1. Increase in ethnic diversity (no interethnic income inequality)










Thick dashed lines: High status (￿ = 0:5). Thin lines: Low status (￿ = 0:25).
The thick dashed horizontal line in Figure 1 indicates the equilibrium tax rate as a
function of the proportion of blacks when agents care relatively much about the status of
the group they identify with (￿ = 0:5).26 The more important is status, the more likely
it is that poor blacks and poor whites identify with their respective ethnic groups. In
this example, the status parameter is so high that poor blacks always identify themselves
as black. Poor whites, on the other hand, identify as poor when society is ethnically
homogenous (less than 7 percent blacks) and the higher poor tax rate is the only possible
equilibrium. The poor tax rate is an equilibrium also when the proportion of blacks is
between 7 and 24 percent. However, since poor whites now identify as white at the lower
ethnic tax rate, this can also be an equilibrium. When the proportion of blacks is above
24 percent, poor whites identify as white at all tax rates and only the ethnic tax rate is an
26The parameters used in this example are pP = 0:68, yP = 100, yR = 300, ￿ = 0:50, ￿ = 20, ￿ = 4 and
￿ = 1:3:
16equilibrium. Hence, poor whites already identify as white at the point when they become
a minority (at 27 percent blacks), implying that the tax rate is una⁄ected by this shift in
potential majorities.
The equilibrium tax rate in the second parametric example is indicated by the thin lines
in Figure 1. The only di⁄erence compared to the previous example is that status is less
important (￿ = 0:25 compared to ￿ = 0:50), which has two di⁄erent e⁄ects: It makes it
more likely that the poor identify with their social class, and it leads to a higher ethnic tax
rate. In this example, poor whites always identify as poor. When the proportion of blacks
is below 27 percent, poor whites are in majority and since they always identify as poor, the
poor tax is implemented. If the proportion of blacks is between 27 and 40 percent, poor
whites are not in majority and, since poor blacks identify as black at both tax rates, only
the ethnic tax rate is an equilibrium. When the proportion of blacks is between 40 and 44
percent, poor blacks identify as poor at the poor tax rate and as black at the ethnic tax
rate, implying that both tax rates are equilibria. Finally, as the proportion of blacks is
above 44 percent, poor blacks identify as poor at all tax rates and only the poor tax rate
can be an equilibrium.
Note that though the e⁄ect of ethnic diversity on redistribution was monotonic and
negative in the ￿rst parametric example, this is not the case in the second example. In-
stead, redistribution is high when ethnic diversity is either very low or very high. In the
intermediate case, there are enough blacks to in￿ uence the tax rate, but so few that poor
blacks are reluctant to identify with the poor. This provides an explanation for the ￿nding
in Dincer and Lambert (2006) that there is a U-shaped relationship between redistribution
and ethnic fractionalization and polarization across US states.27
Proposition 3 only applies to the case when blacks and whites have the same income.
In many societies, the minority population is poorer than the majority group. In this case,
increasing the size of the minority group decreases the average income in the population,
leading to lower tax rates for given identity choices. We analyze this case formally in
Proposition 4 in Lindqvist and ￿stling (2007) and the results are similar to Proposition
3. One di⁄erence, however, is that there are three instead of two potential equilibrium tax
rates. Since the black group is poorer than the white group, poor blacks now favor higher
taxes when they identify as black than poor whites who identify as white.
So far, we have assumed that the number of poor blacks and rich blacks increase
27Dincer and Lambert (2006) report that the relationship between fractionalization and redistribution is
U-shaped, but do unfortunately not state the sign of the square of their measure of ethnic polarization, just
that it is statistically signi￿cant in all speci￿cations. However, their graphical evidence strongly suggests
that the relationship between ethnic polarization and redistribution is U-shaped. We have contacted the
authors in order to clarify this point, but are still awaiting a response. Note also that since we only have
two ethnic groups in the model, we cannot distinguish between ethnic fractionalization and polarization.
17proportionally, ensuring that the incomes of the black and white groups are held constant.
In many cases, for example immigration, it is more reasonable to assume that it is only the
proportion of poor blacks that increases. This implies a change in income inequality both
within and between the two ethnic groups, which introduces a more intricate interaction
between social class and ethnicity. In Proposition 5 in Lindqvist and ￿stling (2007), we
consider an increase in the proportion of blacks among the poor, holding the average income
of the population constant. One way to think about this case is as an in￿ ow of poor black
immigrants. Such an in￿ ow has counteracting e⁄ects on the identity choices of poor blacks.
On the one hand, both the status of the black identity and the distance to the poor identity
decrease, which makes it more likely that poor blacks identify as poor and favor high taxes.
On the other hand, a higher proportion of poor among blacks also implies that the distance
to the black identity decreases. If there are few black people, the latter e⁄ect is stronger
and an increase in the proportion of poor blacks might induce poor blacks to identify with
the black group and favor less redistribution. Somewhat paradoxically, an increase in the
proportion of poor blacks may therefore reduce the support for redistribution also among
poor blacks.
The results for ethnic diversity may shed some light on the evidence on class voting,
i.e., the extent to which social class determines voting behavior (see Nieuwbeerta and Ultee
1999 for references to this sociological literature). The model suggests that immigration
of foreign low-skilled people might induce poor whites ￿and possibly also poor blacks ￿
to identify with their ethnic group and support lower taxes. The in￿ ow of relatively poor
immigrants may therefore be part of the explanation for why class voting has declined in
Europe during the last decades, as well as why European anti-immigration political parties
seem to have gained in popularity.28 The latter is supported by empirical studies by Knigge
(1998) and Golder (2003) showing that the support for anti-immigration parties is indeed
increasing in the level of immigration. A competing explanation for the relatively strong
support that anti-immigration parties get from the working class is a fear for increased
competition in the labor market. However, in contrast to our model, this does not explain
why these parties often advocate a low level of redistribution (see for example Betz 1993,
Poglia Mileti et al. 2002 and McGann and Kitschelt 2005).29 In addition, the empirical
evidence on the relationship between support for anti-immigration parties and the level of
unemployment is ambiguous (see Knigge 1998 and Golder 2003).30
28Examples of such parties include FP￿ (Austria), Schweizerische Volkspartei (Switzerland), Dansk
Folkeparti (Denmark), Vlaams Blok (Belgium), Fremskridtspartiet (Norway) and Front national (France).
29The political bundling e⁄ect in a two-dimensional policy space demonstrated by Roemer (1998) can
explain why a voter could vote for a right-wing party although she favors a high degree of redistribution,
but not why anti-immigration parties tend to focus on right-wing economic policies in the ￿rst place.
30Of course, the absence of any relation between the unemployment rate and anti-immigration senti-
ments is only an argument against the labor market hypothesis if agents are not perfectly forward-looking
185 Income Inequality
Income inequality can mean two di⁄erent things in this model ￿the income di⁄erence
between social classes and the di⁄erence in income between ethnic groups. We ￿rst analyze
the e⁄ects of income inequality between rich and poor.
Standard models of income redistribution, e.g. Meltzer and Richard (1981), predict
that redistribution increases as a response to an increase in pre-tax income inequality
as measured by the distance between the average and median income. When income
inequality increases, the poor become poorer compared to the rich which increases their
demand for redistribution. In our model there is a counteracting e⁄ect since an increase in
income inequality increases the status of ethnic identities, which might lead to a shift to
ethnic identities and lower tax rates. Since the comparative statics are considerably more
complicated if blacks are poorer than whites, without bringing many additional insights,
Proposition 4 is only stated for the case when whites and blacks have the same average
income.31
Proposition 4 If poor whites are in minority and if whites and blacks have the same
average income, then an increase in pre-tax income inequality (yR ￿ yP), while average
income y is held constant, implies the following for the equilibrium tax rate:
1. If poor blacks identify as black, the tax rate increases. Furthermore, if in addition
income inequality is high (yP=y < (1 ￿ ￿)=2), poor blacks (and possibly poor whites)
might switch to the poor identity which increases the tax rate further. If income
inequality instead is low (yP=y > (1 ￿ ￿)=2), the identity choices of poor blacks are
unchanged.
2. If poor whites and poor blacks initially identify as poor, the tax rate increases and the
identity choices of the poor are unchanged if income inequality is high (yP=y < 1=2).
If instead income inequality is low (yP=y > 1=2), poor blacks (and possibly poor
whites) might switch to ethnic identities which leads to a lower tax rate.
As can be seen in Proposition 4, the e⁄ect of an increase in pre-tax income inequality
depends on the initial degree of income inequality. If income inequality is initially high, the
tax rate increases so much in response to an increase in pre-tax income inequality that after-
tax income inequality decreases, which decreases the relative status of the ethnic identities.
regarding the e⁄ects of increased immigration, but adjust their beliefs about negative e⁄ects of immigration
in response to a high level of unemployment.
31Proposition 4 is only stated for the case when poor whites are in minority since the case when poor
whites are in majority follows directly once it is noted that the identity choices of poor blacks do not a⁄ect
the equilibrium.
19On the other hand, if income inequality is initially low, after-tax income inequality increases
and the ethnic identities become more attractive.
To see why this is the case, note that an increase in income inequality has two coun-
teracting e⁄ects on the relative status of ethnic and poor identities. For given tax rates,
higher pre-tax income inequality implies that the ethnic identities become more attractive
for poor blacks and poor whites. On the other hand, for given identity choices, the tax
rate increases as a response to higher inequality, which makes the poor identities more
attractive. To see these two e⁄ects, note that the status di⁄erence between the ethnic
and class identities is some population parameter times (1 ￿ t)(yR ￿ yP).32 Di⁄erentiating
with respect to yR ￿ yP gives
@ (1 ￿ t)(yR ￿ yP)
@ (yR ￿ yP)
= (1 ￿ t) ￿
@t
@ (yR ￿ yP)
(yR ￿ yP): (6)
The ￿rst term in this expression is the direct e⁄ect of income inequality, whereas the
second term is the e⁄ect through the increase in the tax rate. Since @t=@ (yR ￿ yP) does
not depend on yR ￿ yP, this latter e⁄ect is stronger if income inequality is initially high.
The result that an increase in income inequality has ambiguous e⁄ects on redistribu-
tion ￿ts well with recent empirical evidence showing no clear connection between income
inequality and redistribution (see Perotti 1996 and Lind 2005). However, our model is not
the ￿rst to produce this result. For example, in Corneo and Gr￿ner (2000) the median
voter prefers less redistribution as economic inequality increases, since the cost of taxa-
tion in terms of lost social prestige relative to the working class increases with economic
inequality. The result that an increase in pre-tax income inequality might induce the poor
to switch identity and thus favor lower taxes is also present in a slightly di⁄erent ￿ avor in
Shayo (2009).
The model also allows us to study the e⁄ect of a change in income di⁄erences across
ethnic groups. In Proposition 7 in Lindqvist and ￿stling (2007), we model interethnic
income inequality as an increase in the number of poor blacks and a corresponding decrease
in the number of poor whites, while the total number of poor and blacks is held constant.33
The main prediction is that the level of redistribution falls as interethnic income inequality
increases if the black minority group is small, but might increase if the black group is large.
This results is partly in line with the theoretical and empirical results provided by Lind
32One way to see this is to consider the conditions for ethnic identi￿cation for poor blacks and poor
whites in the Appendix, i.e., A.7 and A.8.
33Studying interethnic inequality in this way implies that the distances are a⁄ected, whereas these are
una⁄ected by a change in standard income inequality. In a model with more than two income groups,
interethnic inequality could instead be analyzed as income changes that wouldn￿ t a⁄ect distances.
20(2007), who argues that interethnic inequality reduces the support for redistribution.34
The novel idea behind our result is that higher income inequality between ethnic groups
might induce the poor of the majority group to switch to their ethnic identity in order to
enjoy the higher status of their ethnic group.
6 Social Mobility
A recent literature has argued that beliefs about the causes of poverty is an important
determinant of attitudes toward redistribution.35 Alesina et al. (2001) and Fong (2001)
show empirically that the belief that poverty is caused by laziness and not bad luck is a
strong predictor of negative attitudes toward redistribution.36 Arguably, if the poor believe
that the rich have worked hard for their higher incomes, they are less likely to feel aversion
toward the rich. Conversely, the rich would feel more sympathetic toward the poor if they
thought that poverty was caused by bad luck instead of laziness.
Beliefs about social mobility can be incorporated into our model in a reduced form way
through the class tension parameter, ￿. In the original model, a high ￿ push both the rich
and the poor toward identifying with their social class. However, the belief that poverty is
caused by laziness should have di⁄erential e⁄ects depending on social class: the rich should
be more likely to identify with their social class the stronger is this belief while the poor
should be more prone to identify with their ethnic group. To incorporate this in the model,
we reinterpret ￿ as the prevalence of the belief that ￿poverty is caused by laziness￿and
replace ￿ by 1=￿ in the distance functions to the ethnic identity for poor blacks and poor
whites. In this case, a high ￿ tend to push the rich toward class identi￿cation, whereas
the poor are pushed toward ethnic identi￿cation. This provides a simple argument for
why beliefs about the causes of poverty may matter for redistribution. Strong beliefs that
poverty is caused by laziness make it more likely that the poor identify with their ethnic
group, which in turn implies low taxes (compared to the case with class identi￿cation).
Such beliefs are of course likely to directly a⁄ect preferences for redistribution, but the
possibility of identity shifts demonstrates an extra channel through which those beliefs
may lead to lower redistribution.
34Lind (2007) shows this theoretically in a model where people￿ s altruism are targeted towards their
own group. He also provides somewhat weak empirial support that between group inequality reduces the
support for redistribution (using U.S. panel data from 1969 to 2000).
35See for example Piketty (1995), Alesina and Angeletos (2005) and BØnabou and Tirole (2006) for
models where such beliefs are endogenously determined.
36Gilens (1999, p. 172￿ 173) develops a similar argument: ￿The belief that black Americans lack com-
mitment to the work ethic is central to whites￿opposition to welfare. But it appears that this race-based
opposition does not primarily re￿ ect either a general racial animosity or an e⁄ort to defend whites￿con-
crete group interests. Rather, the racial component of white opposition to welfare seems to re￿ ect the most
important nonracial basis of welfare opposition: the perception that welfare recipients are undeserving.￿
217 American Exceptionalism
Why is redistribution so much lower in the US compared to Western Europe? In terms
of our model, the US population of European origin are referred to as ￿white￿ , whereas
the African American population is referred to as ￿black￿ .37 This is a simpli￿cation since
people of Hispanic origin now constitute a larger share of the US population than African
Americans. However, the increase of the Hispanic population in the US is a relatively recent
phenomenon, and we believe the relationship between US citizens of European descent
and African Americans to be of particular importance for understanding redistributive
policies.38 Moreover, the thrust of the argument outlined below would not change if the
model were to be extended with a third ￿Hispanic￿ ethnic group. In case of Western
Europe, we refer to the native population as ￿white￿and immigrants of non-European
descent as ￿black￿ . We point to three aspects of our model of particular relevance for
understanding the comparably low level of redistribution in the US.
First, pre-tax income inequality is higher in the US than in Western Europe. On the one
hand, the tax preferred by the poor is increasing in income inequality for given identities.
On the other hand, if income inequality in the US and Western Europe is lower than the
threshold in Proposition 4, then the higher level of income inequality in the US will make
the poor more likely to identify with their ethnic group. Hence, the e⁄ect on redistribution
from the higher pre-tax income inequality in the US is ambiguous.
Second, the higher degree of ethnic diversity in the US may imply that poor whites in
the US are more likely to identify as white and favor a low level of redistribution (under
the conditions given in Proposition 5 of Lindqvist and ￿stling 2007). Similarly, to the
extent that interethnic income inequality is higher in the US, Proposition 7 in Lindqvist
and ￿stling (2007) shows that this might be an additional force in the same direction.
Moreover, the preferred tax rate of poor whites when they identify themselves as white is
decreasing in the a› uence of whites. Hence, to the extent that whites in the US are more
wealthy than their counterparts in Europe, poor whites in the US who identify as white
favor a lower tax rate than poor whites in Europe identifying as white, holding everything
else constant.
Third, Americans are much more prone than Europeans to believe that the poor are
lazy rather than unlucky. In addition, the US has historically a more troubled racial
relationship than most European countries. Both of these di⁄erences suggest that the
37Based on survey data on self-reported social class, the restriction to two social classes seems relevant
for the US. For example, in the General Social Surveys 1972-2004 (Davis et al. 2005), 46 percent of
respondents classify themselves as working class, whereas 46 percent classify themselves as middle class.
Of the remaining 8 percent, 5 percent classify themselves as lower class and 3 percent as upper class.
38This has also been the focus in the literature on racial issues in the US, with Myrdal (1944) as the
classic reference. Loury (2002) provides a more recent account on racial stigmatization in the US.
22poor whites should be more likely to identify as white in the US.
These di⁄erent explanations do not yield an unambiguous prediction, but, given the
argument above, it indeed seems plausible that poor white Americans should be more likely
to identify as white and favor low taxes than poor white Europeans. It should be noted,
however, that the di⁄erence in redistribution between the US and Western Europe could
also be rationalized in terms of multiple equilibria.39 Even if the US and Western Europe
were identical in terms fundamentals (i.e., parameter values), it could be the case that
poor whites in Europe identify as poor simply because redistribution is relatively high ￿
if redistribution had been at US levels they would have switched to ethnic identities and
supported lower taxes.
We are not the ￿rst to raise the argument that ethnic diversity is important in explain-
ing di⁄erences in redistribution between the US and Europe. Shayo (2009) argues that a
high degree of ethnic diversity concentrated to the poorer segments of society induces the
poor to identify with their nation instead of their class, thereby reducing the support for
redistribution. Alesina et al. (2001) claim that di⁄erences in beliefs about the poor and
ethnic heterogeneity explains the comparably low level of redistribution in the US through
its impact on altruism. However, since altruism is itself an exogenous parameter in their
theoretical framework, they do not explicitly model how these factors explain altruism.
Moreover, Alesina et al. (2001) consider altruism to be nondiscriminatory across groups,
whereas altruism in our model is only directed at a particular subgroup of the popula-
tion. Lind (2007) studies such directed altruism, but unlike our approach the decision to
sympathize with a particular subgroup is not endogenous in his model.
8 Concluding Remarks
Understanding di⁄erences in redistribution across countries and over time is a key ques-
tion for political science and economics. We contribute to this literature by developing
a model where both identity choices and redistribution are endogenous. The model ad-
dresses a number empirical regularities that are hard to reconcile with the standard model
of redistribution, primarily that ethnic diversity generally is associated with lower levels of
redistribution.
Though our model can explain these patterns, it also suggests that the relationship
between ethnic diversity and redistribution is more complex than acknowledged in the pre-
vious literature. The model predicts that complete ethnic homogeneity leads to high taxes,
39Several other economists have also argued that di⁄erences in the level of redistribution across countries
can be understood in terms of multiple equilibria. See Alesina and Angeletis (2005) and BØnabou and
Tirole (2006) for two recent contributions.
23but the e⁄ect of increases in ethnic diversity from moderate or high levels is ambiguous.
As the size of a small minority group increases, the poor in the majority group become
more prone to identify with their ethnic group and vote for low taxes. On the other hand,
the poor in the minority group become more prone to identify with their social class and
support high taxes. Moreover, even if identity choices remain unchanged, an increase in
the size of a minority group could change tax rates as ethnic minorities are more likely to
identify with their ethnic group.
Our model also provides an explanation for why high pre-tax income inequality is not
always associated with high taxes, in contrast to what one would expect from the standard
model. While the poor have a stronger material self-interest in high tax rates the higher is
income inequality, their immaterial incentive to identify with their ethnic group might also
increase with income inequality. This leads to the seemingly paradoxical result that class
identi￿cation may be more prevalent in societies with small income di⁄erences between
social classes.
The model discussed in this paper could be extended in several ways. For example, one
could add a middle class identity or a third ethnic group to the model. A more challenging
tasks is to endogenize the social categories individuals can identify with. The notion that
such social categorizations may change over time is discussed by, for example, Alesina and
La Ferrara 2005a and Posner 2005. Relatedly, groups may have incentives to manipulate
the identity choices of others. For example, the rich might try to reduce the level of
redistribution by convincing the poor to identify with their ethnic group. This could be
done by directly in￿ uencing their identity choice through propaganda, or, more indirectly,
by trying to create new ethnic categories.
24Appendix: Proofs
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
We know that l￿
i (t) is non-decreasing in t and that t￿
i (li) is non-decreasing in li. Conse-
quently, t￿
i (l￿
i (t)) is non-decreasing in t, which implies that the median tax is non-decreasing
in t. Equilibrium tax rates are given by the ￿xed points of ￿(￿i2Nt￿
i (l￿
i (t))). Note that
this is a non-decreasing mapping ￿(t) : [0;1] ! [0;1]. This mapping will typically not
be continuous, but since it is a non-decreasing mapping from the unit interval to the unit
interval, Tarski￿ s ￿xed point theorem implies that there is at least one ￿xed point of ￿(t)
(see Theorem M.I.3 in Mas-Colell et al. 1995).
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
It is clear from (2) that the poor always prefer positive tax rates, the rich prefer zero taxes,
and that preferred tax rates for given identity choices is unchanged when the composition
of ethnic groups changes. Since the poor are in majority, the median voter(s) is poor. The
average incomes and distances to the ethnic groups are the same for all ethnic groups and
do not change as the composition of ethnic groups changes. Let the average income in the
ethnic groups be denoted by yE and the distances by dE. Letting pj denote the proportion
of the population belonging to ethnic group j, we can re-write the distance to the poor
identity for a poor person in this ethnic group as dPjP = d(￿ (1 ￿ pj)). The condition for
ethnic identi￿cation (3) implies that the poor in ethnic group j identify with their ethnic
group if
d(￿ (1 ￿ pj)) > dE ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ t)(yE ￿ yP)=￿:
In other words, the higher pj is, the lower is the distance to the poor identity and the
more likely is identi￿cation with the poor. This implies that there for a given tax rate
t is a threshold p(t) such that the poor in ethnic groups larger than p(t) identify with
the poor, and the poor in smaller ethnic groups identify with their ethnic group. This
threshold is decreasing in t ￿the higher the tax rate is, the smaller an ethnic group must
be for its members to identify with the ethnic group. Let tP denote the tax rate preferred
by the poor when identifying as poor and de￿ne b p = p(tP). It is clear that poor in the
ethnic groups smaller than b p will always identify with their ethnic group irrespective of the
equilibrium tax rate.
Suppose ￿rst that su¢ ciently many of the poor identify as poor so that the high tax
rate tP prevails. Increasing the size of an ethnic group or adding a new ethnic group could
then lead some of the poor to switch to ethnic identities, which may result in the low
25equilibrium tax rate. (The new low equilibrium tax rate may in turn induce the poor in
other ethnic groups to switch to ethnic identities.)
Now suppose instead the su¢ ciently many poor initially identi￿ed with their ethnic
groups so that the low tax rate preferred by poor identifying with their ethnic group
prevails. Enlarging or adding one ethnic group may then induce some of the poor in the
other groups to switch to ethnic identities (since these become smaller). However, we want
to rule out that the enlarged or new group is not so large that the poor in that group
identify with the poor. This cannot happen if the group is smaller than b p.
A.3 Proof of Lemma 1
The result follows directly from (4) and (5) once it is noted that yP < yW < yR and
yP < yB < yR for the ￿rst part, and yW > yB for the second.
A.4 Identity Inequalities: Black and White model
The condition (3) for high status identi￿cation can be rewritten as follows for poor blacks
and poor whites:
PB : (1 ￿ t)
pRB
pPB + pRB












PW : (1 ￿ t)
pRW
pPW + pRW












For several of the proofs it is useful to rewrite the two inequalities (A.7) and (A.8) as




























(1 ￿ t)(yR ￿ yP)
￿
: (A.10)
A.5 Proof of Lemma 2
We want show that the left hand side of (A.9) is larger than the left hand side of (A.10).








If white and black have the same average income, we only need to show that pPW >
pPB. This follows from the fact that whites are in majority and that blacks and whites
26have the same average income (to see this, divide pRW + pPW > pPB + pRB by pPB and
substitute pRB=pPB = pRW=pPW). Now suppose that whites are on average richer than






















Using that pRW=(pPW + pRW) = 1￿pPW=(pPW + pRW) (and similarly for blacks) we can

















Since whites are richer than blacks, both the left and right hand sides of this expression























Since blacks are on average poorer, the right hand side is positive and we can therefore









Since pPB=(pPB + pRB) > pPW=(pPW + pRW), we can write pPB=(pPB + pRB) = pPW=
(pPW + pRW) + " for some " > 0. Hence, we need to show that pPW=(pPW + pRW) >
(1 ￿ ")=2. The assumption that poor are in majority implies
pPB
pPB + pRB
(pPB + pRB) +
pPW
pPW + pRW










(pPB + pRB) +
pPW
pPW + pRW








1 ￿ 2(pPB + pRB)"
2
:
27Since (pPB + pRB) < 1=2, we have (1 ￿ 2(pPB + pRB)")=2 > (1 ￿ ")=2, and we have
therefore shown what we needed to show.
A.6 Proof of Lemma 3
When whites and blacks are equally rich, we can see from (4) and (5) that the rich will
always prefer zero taxes irrespective of how they identify themselves. Poor identifying
with their ethnic identities will prefer the tax rate 1 ￿ (yP + ￿y)=(1 + ￿)y whereas poor
identifying with their class will prefer the tax rate 1￿yP=y. Since the poor are in majority,
the median tax rate will be either of these two tax rates. The remainder of the result follows
directly from the assumptions that the poor are in majority, blacks are in minority and
poor whites are in minority.
A.7 Proof of Proposition 3
Let pB denote the proportion of poor and pP the proportion of rich. Since whites and
blacks are equally rich, pPB = pPpB, pRB = (1 ￿ pP)pB, pPW = pP (1 ￿ pB) and pRW =
(1 ￿ pP)(1 ￿ pB). Using these relations the two conditions for ethnic identi￿cation (A.9)
























(1 ￿ t)(yR ￿ yP)
￿
:
Since whites and blacks both have the average income y and the average income of
both ethnic groups is unchanged, the median tax rates for given identities and the status
of di⁄erent identities remain unchanged.
First suppose that poor whites initially identify as white so that the tax rate is t￿
PWW =
t￿
PBB (according to Lemma 3). An increase of pB implies that the left hand side of the
identity choice inequality for poor whites increases which in turn implies that identity
choices and hence the tax rate will remain unchanged. This is true both irrespective of
whether poor whites are in majority or not.
Now suppose instead that poor whites are in minority and that both poor blacks and
poor whites identify as poor so that the equilibrium tax rate is t￿
PWP = t￿
PBP. An increase
in pB will then decrease the left hand side of the identity choice inequality for poor blacks
which implies that they will not change their identity. Since the right hand side is the
same for both poor blacks and poor whites and pB < 1=2, poor whites will never identify
as white unless the poor black identify as black and so the tax rate remains unchanged.
28Finally, suppose that poor whites are in minority, poor whites identify as poor and
poor blacks identify as black so that the tax rate is t￿
PWW = t￿
PBB. Increasing pB might
then induce the poor blacks to switch to the poor identity so that the tax rate will be
t￿
PWP = t￿
PBP. Alternatively, poor whites may switch to the white identity, but that would
leave the tax rate una⁄ected (recall that Lemma 2 implies that not both black and white
can switch identities in this case). If instead poor whites are in majority and initially
identify as poor, the tax rate is t￿
PWP = t￿
PBP and an increase in pB might induce them to
shift to the white identity, resulting in the low tax rate t￿
PWW = t￿
PBB.
A.8 Proof of Proposition 4
As income inequality changes, the only thing that changes in the conditions for ethnic
identi￿cation (A.7) and (A.8) is the term (1 ￿ t)(yR ￿ yP) which re￿ ects the relative status
of the ethnic identity over the poor identity. Since blacks and whites are equally rich, there
are only two tax rates in equilibrium: t￿
PWW = t￿
PBB = 1 ￿ (yP + ￿y)=(1 + ￿)y and
t￿
PWP = t￿
PBP = 1￿yP=y. Clearly, both these tax rates increase with income inequality for
given identity choices. Since both the tax rate and income inequality increase, the e⁄ect
on relative status (1 ￿ t)(yR ￿ yP) is ambiguous.
Since we keep average income constant, i.e., @y=@ (yR ￿ yP) = 0, it must hold that
@yP





@ (yR ￿ yP)
:
It is the case that @ (yR ￿ yP)=@ (yR ￿ yP) = 1 and this implies that
@yR
@ (yR ￿ yP)
￿
@yP
@ (yR ￿ yP)
= 1:
Combining these two observations we get
@yP
@ (yR ￿ yP)
= ￿(1 ￿ pP) and
@yR
@ (yR ￿ yP)
= pP:
Now consider the case when poor blacks identify as black (and perhaps poor whites identify
as white). For given identity choices, the tax rate increases. If poor blacks switch to the
poor identity, then the tax rate increases further. To see if this can happen, note that the
29e⁄ect on relative status of higher income inequality is given by
@ (1 ￿ t￿
PBB)(yR ￿ yP)
@ (yR ￿ yP)














Rearranging the latter expression shows that relative status is increasing in income in-
equality if and only if yP=y > (1 ￿ ￿)=2. If this condition is satis￿ed, then the identity
choice of poor blacks remain unchanged. Otherwise, poor blacks might switch to the poor
identity. From Lemma 2 we also know that if poor blacks switch to the poor identity, then
poor whites will switch to the poor identity as well (unless they already identi￿ed as poor)
Now consider the case when both poor blacks and poor whites identify as poor. In this
case, the e⁄ect on relative status is given by
@ (1 ￿ t￿
PBP)(yR ￿ yP)
@ (yR ￿ yP)













(1 ￿ pP)(yR ￿ yP):
This is increasing if yP=y > 1=2. Note that if this condition holds, then relative status at
the ethnic tax rate is increasing for all values of ￿. If yP=y > 1=2, then poor blacks (and
possibly poor whites) might switch to ethnic identities, implying that the net e⁄ect on the
tax rate is ambiguous. However, if yP=y < 1=2, identity choices remain unchanged and the
tax rate will increase.
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